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Climate change mitigation programs classify two types of carbon offsets:
Additional and non-additional. Additional offsets are offsets that correspond
to actual reductions in emissions. In contrast, non-additional offsets are offsets
that do not correspond to emissions reductions. These offsets are created
because offset projects with business-as-usual (BAU) emissions below their
assigned baseline can claim offsets up to the baseline without reducing emissions.
Since the sale and use of non-additional offsets by firms in climate mitigation
programs has the effect of raising aggregate emissions, an extraordinary amount
of focus has been on ensuring that offsets are additional. However, we show
here that there is an emissions component that has been neglected in current
policy design. This component, which we call Super-additional reductions, are
emissions reductions which do not lead to a supply of offsets. Super-additional
reductions arise from offset projects with BAU emissions above their baseline.
These projects are awarded a quantity of offsets that is lower than the project’s
emissions reductions. The presence of such emissions reductions without supply
of equivalent offsets has the effect of lowering aggregate emissions and lessening
the impact of non-additional offsets. Our numerical simulations show that super-
additional reductions can be as large as the supply of non-additional offsets, and
in some scenarios can even exceed them. Neglecting this component during the
climate policy design process can lead to the setting of overly stringent baselines
or other policy instruments, ultimately raising the compliance costs of achieving
emissions reduction targets.
Complementing climate mitigation programs with carbon offsets supplied from uncapped
sectors is recognized as a way of achieving emissions reduction targets at lower economic
cost1–5. However, awarding offsets to carbon mitigation projects requires programs to set
a project-specific baseline that attempts to measure the project’s BAU emissions, or what
the project would have emitted in the absence of the program. If offset project managers
have more information on their BAU emissions than the regulator who assigns the project
baseline, then the program will adversely select projects that are assigned a baseline above
BAU emissions. These projects opt into the program because they can claim offsets up to the
baseline while not reducing emissions. This process creates a supply of non-additional offsets.
The exact quantity of non-additional offsets cannot be known with certainty because they are,
by definition, a function of a hypothetical outcome (i.e. BAU emissions). Nevertheless it has
been suggested that roughly 40 percent of projects (comprising 20 percent of the entire offset
supply) in the largest carbon offset program, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
are non-additional6. When non-additional offsets are sold to firms under an emissions cap,
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they permit additional emissions to be released by the capped sector, leading to increase in
aggregate emissions. The impact of these non-additional offsets on total emissions has been
a cause for concern7–12. Policy makers have responded by proposing various instruments to
control them, including more stringent baselines, trade ratios that specify how offsets convert
to fungible emissions allowances, and limits on offset usage by the capped sector13–15.
Non-additional offsets arise because of how emissions reductions are awarded relative to
a project’s baseline. But the award system also leads to reductions that do not generate
offsets. Consider a potential supplier whose BAU emissions are 1, 750 tons but their baseline
has been set at 1, 000 tons. Until the supplier reduces emissions by at least 750 tons, offset
supply cannot begin. But if the price of offsets is sufficiently high, the project manager may
find it profitable to reduce emissions further, to say 500 tons. In other words, the revenue
from offsets supply of 500 tons more than compensates for the costs of the first 750 tons of
mitigation and then the next 500 tons of mitigation (which generates the offsets supply).
The actions of this project have served to reduce total emissions by 750 tons, since this
reduction is not part of the offsets that are allowed to be supplied in the market. We call
this reduction super-additional.
The supply of additional and non-additional offsets, the quantity of super-additional
reductions and their impact on aggregate emissions depend on the decisions of offset projects
(Table 1). We develop a model of a carbon offset program to identify the source of each
of these components. Our model incorporates the feature that project developers have
private information on their BAU emissions (see Methods). A policy maker sets baselines
after observing a uncertain measurement of BAU emissions, which may be greater than,
less than or equal to BAU emissions. This feature explicitly models the adverse selection
problem that plagues carbon offset programs. To determine the emissions and compliance
cost consequences of including offsets in climate mitigation programs, we assume that all
offsets created are supplied to a representative capped sector. One offset that is supplied
to the capped sector increases capped sector emissions by one unit. If less than one unit of
emissions reductions by offset projects accompanies this offset, then aggregate emissions —
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defined as the sum of offset project emissions and capped sector emissions — increase. In
contrast, if more than one unit of emissions reductions by offset projects accompanies this
offset, then aggregate emissions decrease.
The framework developed here assumes that the decision of a project to generate offsets
will depend on four variables: its BAU emissions, ui, its baseline, bi, the price of offsets,
p, and its marginal costs of mitigation, ci. Given these, each project can calculate the
profitability of reducing emissions sufficiently to generate offsets, and the optimal level of
offset supply. Figure 1 gives a stylistic representation of different combinations of these
variables that divide projects into different categories (see the Supplementary Information
for a derivation of Figure 1). The ratio of project i’s baseline to its BAU emissions, bi/ui,
is shown on the horizontal axis while marginal costs of mitigation, ci, is on the vertical axis.
The price of offsets p is shown on the vertical axis.
Given the price of offsets, for some projects the costs of mitigation will be so high that
they will not find it worthwhile to reduce emissions to generate offsets. These are projects
in the regions A1, A2 and A4. Projects in regions A1 and A2 cannot engage at all with
the offsets market because their BAU emissions are above the baseline. However, projects
in region A4 do not reduce emissions but can nevertheless claim offsets because their BAU
emissions are below their baseline bi. These are projects that claim non-additional offsets.
Allowing them in the market permits an increase in emissions from the capped sector, without
any corresponding decrease in the uncapped sector. Projects in region A5 also have BAU
emissions below their baseline bi, and so will supply non-additional offsets. However, their
mitigation costs are low enough that they will find it profitable to reduce emissions to below
their BAU level. Thus the supply of offsets from these projects will consist of both additional
and non-additional offsets. Projects in region A3 have BAU emissions above the baseline,
but still low enough to find it profitable to reduce emissions below the baseline to earn
a return from offsets. These projects will supply additional offsets, emissions reductions
which correspond to offsets supplied to the market. However, they will also have emissions
reductions which do not correspond to any offset supply, because offsets are counted from
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their baseline. These emissions reductions are what we have called super-additional. Projects
in this region supply additional offsets and super-additional reductions.
We develop numerical simulations for a model of offset supply to yield some generic
insights applicable to current and future carbon offset programs. Although we attempt to
convey general conclusions, we must commit our analysis to specific parameters in simulating
the model. Our central case values for the parameters that influence offset supply decisions
are based on United States offset supply data (see Supplementary Methods for a complete
description of the data and model calibration). Our simulations quantify how large super-
additional reductions are relative to non-additional offsets.
We discovered that for a range of parameter values, the super-additional reductions exceed
the supply of non-additional offsets if baselines are set stringent enough. Figure 2 shows
the composition of offsets and emissions changes for a range of baselines on the horizontal
axis, expressed as a proportion of observed BAU emissions. A proportion less than one
implies that every project’s baseline is less than its observed BAU emissions. The vertical
axis measures offset supply and emissions changes in terms of million metric tons of CO2
equivalent (MMTCO2e).
The different curves show outcomes for the supply of non-additional offsets (NA),
aggregate change in emissions (∆E), and super-additional reductions (SA). The aggregate
change in emissions is relative to a program that does not include offsets. If the price of
offsets is high (p = 40) and when baselines are set to be less than 60 percent observed BAU
emissions, super-additional reductions exceed the supply of non-additional offsets (Figure
2g,h,i). For this range of baselines, emissions decrease. A high offsets price encourages
greater participation by project developers as the marginal returns to mitigating emissions
is higher. Therefore it is more likely for projects with assigned baselines less than their
BAU emissions to opt in and mitigate. This increases the quantity of super-additional
reductions while having no effect on the supply of non-additional offsets. When the degree
of uncertainty on BAU emissions is low (Figure 2g), less stringent baselines are necessary for
aggregate emissions to fall. Low BAU emissions uncertainty implies that a project is more
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likely to receive a baseline that matches its BAU emissions. This has the effect of reducing
the supply of non-additional offsets since there will be fewer projects that have baselines
above their BAU emissions.
If the degree of uncertainty on observed BAU emissions is high, it is less likely for the
quantity of super-additional reductions to exceed the supply of non-additional offsets (Figure
2c,f,i). A higher degree of uncertainty implies that projects have more extreme observed BAU
emissions. A project that has an observed BAU emissions that is substantially larger than
its BAU emissions is more likely to receive a baseline the exceeds its BAU emissions. This
project will likely opt in and earn non-additional offsets. On the other hand, a project that
has an observed BAU emissions that is substantially lower than its BAU emissions is more
likely to receive a baseline so low that it will not longer find it profitable to opt in. In this
case, the project does not participate in the program and does not generate super-additional
reductions. When the price of offsets is low (p = 10, Figure 2c), this effect is amplified as
projects have a lower revenue incentive to opt in and mitigate. In this case, project baselines
must be very stringent — less than 35 percent of observed BAU emissions — for the quantity
of super-additional reductions to exceed the supply of non-additional offsets.
For an offsets price of p = 25 and a medium level of uncertainty (Figure 2e), the net
effect on emissions of creating an offsets market is zero when baselines equal 63 percent of
observed BAU emissions. However, focusing on the supply of non-additional offsets — which
is 44 MMTCO2e under these conditions — would erroneously suggest that emissions would
increase. The total effect of including offsets in a climate change mitigation program on
emissions is thus overstated by focusing only on non-additional offsets.
Consequences of Neglecting Super-Additionality If policy makers ignore super-
additional reductions, there will be a tendency to setting overly stringent baselines to control
non-additionality. As a consequence, climate change mitigation programs will forego the
economic benefits of additional offsets. There is evidence that current offset programs focus
on non-additionality while ignoring super-additionality. Virtually all offset protocols set
baselines to ensure against the possibility of over-rewarding projects. For example, in the
6
Joint Implementation Guidance on Criteria for Baseline Setting and Monitoring, there are
two criteria that aim to minimize awarding projects with non-additional offsets16:
1. A baseline shall be established by taking account of uncertainties and using conservative
assumptions. (p.4)
2. Taking into account that a baseline be established in a transparent manner and using
conservative assumptions, explicitly explain the assumptions and substantiate choices.
In case of uncertainty regarding values of variables and parameters, the establishment
of a baseline is considered conservative if the resulting projection of the baseline does
not lead to an overestimation of emission reductions or enhancements of net removals
attributable to the JI project. (p. 14, italics added for emphasis)
California’s cap-and-trade program under the Global Warming Solutions Act has a similar
baseline stringency for forest-based offsets. The Air Resources Board Compliance Offset
Protocol for U.S. Forest Projects estimates baselines for avoided conversion projects
by characterizing and projecting the baseline and discounting for the uncertainty of
conversion probability. The protocol states that “any inventory estimate will be subject to
statistical uncertainty...to help ensure that estimates of GHG reductions and GHG removal
enhancements are conservative, a confidence deduction must be applied to each year to the
inventory of actual on site carbon stocks17.”
If the objective of an offsets protocol is to the maintain environmental integrity of a
climate change mitigation program, then super-additionality gives some additional leeway
to protocol designers to set less stringent baselines. The additional leeway encourages
a greater supply of additional offsets, leading to lower overall emission reduction costs.
We quantify these benefits by simulating the model under two general baseline protocols.
The first represents a protocol that minimizes the supply of non-additional offsets. This
protocol neglects the quantity of super-additional reductions and sets stringent baselines to
all projects to prevent the sale of non-additional offsets. The second represents a protocol
that recognizes the quantity of super-additional reductions and sets baselines to ensure
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environmental integrity. This protocol selects project baselines so that the quantity of
super-additional reductions equals the supply of non-additional offsets, which has the effect
of keeping emissions unchanged. Over a range of offset prices, we find that the baseline
protocol that minimizes the supply of non-additional offsets significantly reduces the supply
of additional offsets (Table 2). For an offsets price of 25 dollars per ton of CO2e, we find
that the supply of additional offsets is 40 percent less relative to the baseline protocol that
maintains environmental integrity (Table 2(b)). This result is insensitive to the offset price;
for the range of offset prices considered, we find that the supply of additional offsets is
between 36 percent and 43 percent less relative to the Maintain Environmental Integrity
baseline protocol.
Recognizing super-additional reductions when setting baselines will increase the cost
savings of including offsets in climate change mitigation programs. We estimate that the
additional cost savings from this protocol can be substantial (Supplementary Table 10). We
find that an additional 70−75 percent of compliance cost savings can be achieved when super-
additional reductions are recognized when setting baselines (See Supplementary Information
for a description of this calculation).
Implications of Neglecting Super-Additional Reductions for Instrument Choice
in Carbon Offset Markets Concerns about the impact of non-additionality on total
emissions have led to the development and use of other instruments such as trade ratios
or limits on the use of offsets18. The use of these instruments to address non-additionality,
however, is itself problematic. The use of a trade ratio, which effectively lowers the offsets
price for the uncapped sector, cannot affect the supply of non-additional offsets, since these
are given by the difference between the baseline and BAU emissions. A lower offsets price
makes supplying additional offsets less profitable. As a consequence, fewer additional offsets
will be supplied and a lower quantity of super-additional reductions will emerge from the
offset program. The use of limits on offsets use by the capped sector cannot lower emissions
because it will simply lower the equilibrium price of offsets, and thus again reduce the supply
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of additional offsets and the quantity of super-additional reductions.
The recognition and systematic incorporation of super-additionality into modeling and
policy analysis helps to provide a better perspective for the design of markets for carbon
offsets. It can mitigate the current tendency to adopt inappropriate levels of several policy
instruments because of concerns about non-additionality: stringent baselines, tight trade
ratios and limits on offsets use. Since super-additionality counteracts the effect of non-
additionality on total emissions, it allows a greater role for focus on the economic benefits
of offsets markets.
Methods Our model integrates the decisions of uncapped firms to supply offsets into a
cap-and-trade program. We assume that capped firms purchase the entire supply of offsets
from uncapped projects. Our change in emissions calculations are relative to a cap-and-trade
program that prohibits a capped sector from using offsets for compliance.
We explicitly model the decisions of uncapped projects to supply offsets through a well-
defined profit function. Projects in the uncapped sector make supply decisions based on
five variables: BAU emissions, sequestration potential, an emissions baseline, the price of
offsets, and a marginal cost of mitigation. Project i knows with certainty its BAU emissions,
while the policy maker knows observed BAU emissions, which equal project-specific BAU
emissions plus a project-specific emissions shock. Ex-post emissions are assumed to be
common knowledge that the policy maker can perfectly observe.
Each project decides whether to opt-in and whether to mitigate. The decisions are based
on a profit function defined by Supplementary Equation 3 in the Supplementary Information.
Projects compare the profits of the different decisions and choose the combination that yields
the highest profit. The decisions of the projects yield the different quantities of offset supplies
and super-additional reductions (Supplementary Equations 4-11), which are used to calculate
the change in emissions (Supplementary Equation 12).
We generate the supply of offsets and emissions effects with a simulation calibrated to
United States emissions and mitigation cost data. We assume that there are 1000 potential
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projects that are capable of GHG mitigation. The distribution of marginal costs of mitigation
is assumed to be uniform and is calibrated to match EPA estimates of mitigation cost curves
for the United States forestry and agriculture sector19. BAU emissions of uncapped projects
are also assumed to be uniformly distributed. The sum of initial emissions is calibrated
through data on the total emissions of the uncapped sector19. For each iteration of the
simulation, we generate data by drawing from the defined distributions of each characteristic
for all of the 1000 projects. The projects then make profit-maximizing decisions, which lead
to a supply of offsets, super-additional reductions and emissions changes. We perform 2000
iterations of this procedure to obtain an expected value for each of the key outputs.
We consider a wide range for the price of offsets, with a central value of 25 dollars per
ton of CO2 equivalent that approximates the Social Cost of Carbon
20. The emissions shocks
are independently and identically drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance equal to the expected value of BAU emissions. Baselines are set as a function of
observed BAU emissions. This yields an expected quantity of non-additional offsets equal to
30 percent of total offset supply when baselines are set to equal measured BAU emissions, a
value consistent with survey data on the proportion of offset supply that is non-additional6.
Given these assumptions, we vary the tightness of the baseline, from 0 percent to 100
percent of observed BAU emissions, and analyze the pattern of offset supply, and emissions
changes stemming from the quantity of super-additional reductions and the supply of non-
additional offsets. To establish how neglecting super-additional reductions affects offset
supply and compliance costs, we consider an offset project baseline protocol that sets
baselines in a way to minimize the supply of non-additional offsets. This protocol is
compared to a less stringent one that recognizes the supply of super-additional reductions
and sets baselines in a way that just maintains environmental integrity of the climate change
mitigation program. Baselines set in this manner induce a supply of non-additional offsets
that equal the quantity of super-additional reductions.
Sensitivity analysis around the basic assumptions including the standard deviation of
emissions shocks, the price of offsets, the marginal cost of mitigation, and the correlation
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between BAU emissions and marginal costs of mitigation is reported in the Supplementary
Information, and leaves our basic conclusions unchanged. Supplementary Tables 2-5 report
the ratio of super-additional reductions to non-additional offsets and Supplementary Tables
6-9 report offset supplies for broad ranges of the parameters.
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Table 1 | Offsets supply and emissions consequences of project decisions.
Project i Baseline Relative to BAU Emissions
bi
ui
> 1 bi
ui
= 1 bi
ui
< 1
Project i
Decision
Mitigate
Additional Offsets Additional Offsets Additional Offsets
Non-Additional Super-Additional
Offsets Reductions
Increase in No Change in Decrease in
Emissions Emissions Emissions
Do not mitigate
Non-Additional No Offsets No Offsets
Offsets
Increase in No Change in No Change in
Emissions Emissions Emissions
Projects that mitigate emissions can generate a combination of additional and non-additional
offsets as well as quantities of super-additional reductions. These are projects that fall into
regions A3 and A5 in Figure 1. Projects that have a baseline larger than their BAU emissions(
bi
ui
> 1
)
are located in region A5 and generate additional and non-additional offsets. The
supply of non-additional offsets from these projects increase aggregate emissions. Projects
that have a baseline lower than their BAU emissions
(
bi
ui
> 1
)
are located in region A3
and generate additional offsets and super-additional reductions. The quantity of super-
additional reductions created by these projects lower aggregate emissions. Projects that
mitigate emissions and have a baseline equal to their BAU emissions
(
bi
ui
= 1
)
only generate
additional offsets. These projects do not lead to an emissions change. Projects that do not
mitigate and do not produce offsets and lead to no change in emissions. Projects that do
not mitigate but have a baseline larger than their BAU emissions
(
bi
ui
> 1
)
are located in
region A4 and generate non-additional offsets. These projects lead to an increase in aggregate
emissions.
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Table 2 | The effect of neglecting super-additional reductions when
selecting baselines.
(a) Offsets Price = 10 dollars per ton
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = 0 bi = 0.49u˜i
Total Offset Supply 88 158
Additional Offsets 88 137
Non-Additional Offsets 0 21
Super-Additional Reductions −28 −21
Change in Emissions −28 0
(b) Offsets Price = 25 dollars per ton
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = 0 bi = 0.63u˜i
Total Offset Supply 186 353
Additional Offsets 186 309
Non-Additional Offsets 0 44
Super-Additional Reductions 59 44
Change in Emissions −59 0
(c) Offsets Price = 40 dollars per ton
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Baselines bi = 0 bi = 0.72u˜i
Total Offset Supply 352 672
Additional Offsets 352 613
Non-Additional Offsets 0 59
Super-Additional Reductions −110 59
Change in Emissions −110 0
The Minimize Supply of Non-Additional Offsets protocol is defined by setting
project baselines that guarantee no supply of non-additional offsets. The Maintain
Environmental Integrity protocol is defined by setting project baselines such that
the expected supply of non-additional offsets equals the expected quantity of
super-additional reductions. This protocol keeps expected aggregate emissions
fixed. For each of the three offsets price cases, we assume a medium level of
observed BAU emissions uncertainty.
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Figure 1 | Decisions of uncapped sector projects. The horizontal axis denotes the ratio
of a project’s assigned baseline (bi) and its BAU emissions (ui). The vertical axis measures
a project’s marginal cost of mitigation (ci), where the horizontal line p represents the price
of offsets. projects in regions A1 and A2 do not opt in. projects in regions A3 and A5 opt
in and choose to mitigate. projects falling in region A5 opt in but do not mitigate. Region
A3 includes projects that produce Super-Additional Reductions. The curve ci(bi/ui) denotes
a zero-profit condition of the project profit-maximization problem (see the Supplementary
Information for a formal definition and derivation).
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Figure 2 | The change in aggregate emissions relative to a program that does not include offsets, as a function of
normalized project baselines. Panels in the same row are simulations that have a common offsets price. We consider three
offset prices: Low (p = 10, a,b,c), medium (p = 25, d,e,f) and high (p = 40, g,h,i). Panels in the same column are simulations
that have the same uncertainty on observed BAU emissions. We consider three levels of uncertainty: Low (a,d,g), medium
(b,e,h) and high (c,f,i). Normalized project baselines are defined as a project’s assigned baseline (bi) divided by the project’s
observed BAU emissions (u˜i). The change in emissions (∆E) is defined relative to a climate mitigation program that does not
include offsets. Its value is calculated by adding the supply of non-additional offsets (NA) and the quantity of super-additional
reductions (SA). For low baselines, the change in emissions is negative as the quantity of super-additional reductions dominates
the supply of non-additional offsets.
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Supplementary Information for Super-Additionality: A
Neglected Force in Markets for Carbon Offsets
Supplementary Methods
The Model
The model includes a capped and an uncapped sector. The capped sector is regulated by a
well-functioning cap-and-trade program. We do not explicitly model the behavior of capped
units or the allocation of permits. Instead we focus on integrating into the program decisions
of uncapped projects that supply offsets. We assume that capped firms purchase the entire
supply of offsets from uncapped projects. We quantify how including offsets in climate
mitigation programs affects emissions relative to a program that does not include offsets.
Including offsets raises emissions relative to a no-offsets program if there is a significant
supply of non-additional offsets used by capped firms. In contrast, including offsets may
reduce emissions relative to a no-offsets program if there is a significant quantity of super-
additional reductions. The net emissions effect of including offsets in climate mitigation
programs will depend on the magnitude of these two forces.
There are n uncapped projects that make a decision to supply offsets. Project i
makes its decision based on four project-specific characteristics and the offsets price. The
four characteristics include the marginal costs of mitigation (ci), BAU emissions (ui),
sequestration potential (si) and an emissions baseline (bi). Marginal costs are constant
and are drawn from a cumulative distributional function Z(c) with support [c, c]. BAU
emissions lie within a support [u, u] where each ui is independently drawn from the cumulative
distribution function Y (u). Project i’s sequestration potential is drawn from a cumulative
distribution function X(s) that has a support [s, s].
The model has three periods. In period 1, project i observes its marginal cost of
mitigation, BAU emissions and sequestration potential. In period 2, the policy maker
measures BAU emissions u˜i of each project with uncertainty. Project i’s measured BAU
S-1
emissions, denoted by u˜i, are equal to BAU emissions plus an emissions shock εi ∼ N (0, σ2):
u˜i = ui + εi. (Supplementary Equation 1)
Each project receives a baseline, bi, that equals a proportion of measured BAU emissions:
bi = αu˜i. (Supplementary Equation 2)
The proportion α > 0 can be less than, equal to, or greater than one. In period 3, projects
make opt-in and mitigation decisions based on their profit function
pii = max
si≤ei≤ui
{p(bi − ei)− ci(ui − ei)} , (Supplementary Equation 3)
where p is the price of offsets. If pii ≥ 0, then project i opts-in and supplies a quantity of
offsets equal to bi − e∗i , where e∗i solves (Supplementary Equation 3). We assume that the
policy maker perfectly measures ex-post emissions e∗i for each project i.
Defining Offset Supply and Emissions
The supply of offsets from project i, denoted by fi, is given by
fi =

bi − e∗i , if bi − e∗i > 0
0 otherwise.
(Supplementary Equation 4)
The total supply of offsets, denoted by F , is defined as the sum of offsets from each project:
F =
n∑
i=1
fi. (Supplementary Equation 5)
The supply of additional offsets from project i, denoted by fAi , is given by the difference
between project i’s BAU emissions and its emissions choice:
fAi = ui − e∗i . (Supplementary Equation 6)
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The total supply of additional offsets, denoted by FA, is defined as the sum of additional
offsets from each project:
FA =
n∑
i=1
fAi . (Supplementary Equation 7)
The supply of non-additional offsets from project i, denoted by fNAi , is given by
fNAi =

bi − ui, if bi − ui > 0
0 otherwise.
(Supplementary Equation 8)
The total supply of non-additional offsets, denoted by FNA, is defined as the sum of non-
additional offsets from each project:
FNA =
n∑
i=1
fNAi . (Supplementary Equation 9)
The quantity of super-additional reductions from project i, denoted by ri, is given by
ri =

bi − ui, if bi − ui < 0 and e∗i < u∗i
0 otherwise.
(Supplementary Equation 10)
The total quantity of super-additional reductions, denoted by R, is defined as the sum of
super-additional reductions from each project:
R =
n∑
i=1
ri. (Supplementary Equation 11)
The change in emissions relative to a program without offsets, ∆E, equals the total supply
of non-additional offsets plus the total quantity of super-additional reductions:
∆E = FNA +R. (Supplementary Equation 12)
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Deriving Equations that Generate Figure 1
We create Figure 1 by solving the problem of project i in (Supplementary Equation 3). If
ci > p, then the marginal cost of mitigation exceeds the marginal return of mitigation for
project i. Therefore the project performs no mitigation by selecting ei = ui. In this case,
profits are
pii = p(bi − ui). (Supplementary Equation 13)
If bi < ui, indicated by region A1 in Figure 1, then pii < 0. In this case, project i will not
opt in and will not perform mitigation. If bi > ui, indicated by region A4 in Figure 1, then
pii > 0. In this case, project i will opt in but will not perform mitigation.
Now consider the setting where ci < p. In this setting, the marginal cost of mitigation
is less than the marginal return of mitigation for project i. If bi > ui, indicated by region
A5 in Figure 1, then pii > 0. In this case, project i will opt in and will mitigate by selecting
ei = si. If bi < ui, represented by regions A2 and A3, then the project’s decision depends on
the sign of (Supplementary Equation 3). The project will mitigate emissions if the returns
exceed the costs. The necessary condition for project i to mitigate is
p(bi − si)− ci(ui − si) ≥ 0. (Supplementary Equation 14)
The left-hand-side represents project i’s profit if it selects ei = si, while the right-hand-side
represents project i’s profit if it does not opt in. Solving (Supplementary Equation 14) for
ci yields
ci ≤ p(bi − si)
ui − si . (Supplementary Equation 15)
The curve ci
(
bi
ui
)
in Figure 1 represents the case when (Supplementary Equation 15) is
binding. Figure 1 illustrates the case where a project has a sequestration rate equal to zero,
si = 0. Projects with marginal costs above the curve do not find it profitable to opt in
and mitigate emissions, represented by region A2, while those with marginal costs below the
curve achieve positive net revenue from opting in and mitigating emissions, represented by
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region A3.
Calibration
The model is calibrated to observed emissions inventory data and Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates of marginal mitigation costs and sequestration potential. Total
Net BAU emissions are defined as the sum of emissions and sequestration among offset
sources, which sum to 365 MMTCO2e19. Total Sequestration Potential is defined as the
maximum quantity of sequestration that can occur among offset sources. In general, the
larger the sequestration potential, the larger the supply of offsets. We obtain a value of
−1, 027 MMTCO2e by subtracting the EPA’s estimate of the supply of offsets at a carbon
price of 211 dollars from Total Net BAU emissions. This value represents an upper bound on
the quantity of sequestration that can occur given marginal cost of mitigation estimates19.
To calibrate the marginal cost of mitigation schedule, we require a value for total mitigation
among all projects given an offsets price. We calibrate the marginal cost of mitigation
schedule at our central price of 25 dollars. At this price, total mitigation among offsets
suppliers is estimated to be 486 MMTCO2e. This mitigation comes from afforestation,
animal waste, agricultural practices, forest management and soil sequestration19.
We assume that the distributions for marginal costs of mitigation, BAU emissions and
sequestration potential are uniform and independently distributed. We find that our results
are not sensitive to this assumption by varying the correlation between the marginal costs
of mitigation and BAU emissions (Supplementary Table 5 and Supplementary Table 9).
Project-level BAU emissions are assumed to be have a mean equal to Total BAU emissions
divided by the number of projects, with a lower bound equal to zero and an upper bound
equal to two times the Total BAU emissions divided by the number of projects. Project-level
sequestration potential are assumed to have a mean equal to Total Sequestration Potential
divided by the number of projects, with an upper bound equal to zero and a lower bound
equal to two times the Total Sequestration Potential divided by the number of projects.
These assumptions ensure that the distributions are independent and that the project-level
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expected value of each variable equals the observed data divided by the number of projects.
To calibrate our model to match the estimated mitigation at a carbon price of 25 dollars, we
solve for the bound of the marginal cost of mitigation distribution that yields an expected
supply of offsets curve that matches the marginal cost of mitigation point estimate obtained
from the literature. Denote C(q) as the cost of achieving a mitigation quantity of q. The
mitigation cost function can be written as
C(q) =
cˆ∫
c
u∫
u
s∫
s
c(u− s)dXdY dZ, (Supplementary Equation 16)
where the quantity of mitigation is defined by
q =
cˆ∫
c
u∫
u
s∫
s
(u− s)dXdY dZ. (Supplementary Equation 17)
The variable cˆ defines the cut-off between projects that mitigate and those that do not. The
cost of mitigation function assumes that mitigation comes from projects with the lowest
marginal costs. Given that the distributions for BAU emissions, sequestration potential and
marginal costs are uniform, we can integrate (Supplementary Equation 17) to obtain
q =
cˆ− c
c− c (E[u]− E[s]) . (Supplementary Equation 18)
Solving (Supplementary Equation 18) for cˆ yields
cˆ =
q(c− c)
E[u]− E[s] . (Supplementary Equation 19)
Substituting (Supplementary Equation 19) into (Supplementary Equation 16) and
integrating yields
C(q) =
q2
2
c− c
E[u]− E[s] + qc. (Supplementary Equation 20)
We set the lower bound of marginal costs equal to zero, c = 0. Differentiating
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(Supplementary Equation 20) with respect to q and solving for c yields
c =
C ′(q)
q
(E[u]− E[s]) . (Supplementary Equation 21)
Observing data on marginal costs of mitigation (C ′(q)), estimated mitigation (q), and
expected BAU emissions and sequestration potential (E[u] and E[s], respectively) allows
us to calibrate the upper bound of the marginal cost of mitigation distribution.
The standard deviation of the BAU emissions shocks is set to equal the expected value of
BAU emissions, so that 68 percent of the emissions shocks are less than the expected value
of BAU emissions. This yields an expected quantity of non-additional offsets equal to 30
percent of total offset supply when baselines are set to equal measured BAU emissions, a
value consistent with prior literature6. We also consider low and high standard deviation
values that appear in Figure 2. The low and high standard deviations are equal to 75 percent
and 150 percent of the expected value of BAU emissions, respectively. Our model’s calibrated
parameter values appear in Supplementary Table 1.
Calculating the Economic Cost of Neglecting Super-Additional Reductions
For the purposes of quantifying the economic cost of neglecting super-additional reductions,
we model the capped sector in a hypothetical U.S. cap-and-trade program as a single, cost-
minimizing unit that is represented by a marginal abatement cost (MAC) schedule. This is a
standard assumption used to evaluate the compliance costs of cap-and-trade programs22,23.
In addition, this approach mimics the equilibrium outcome of a set of competitive firms24,25
. The capped sector MAC schedule is assumed to be increasing with a constant slope that
matches processed simulation output of the EPA’s analysis of the most recent U.S. climate
change bill, the American Power Act (APA). We set the slope of the MAC schedule equal
to 2.83× 10−8 $ /ton2, so that
MACcapped(q) = 2.83× 10−8q, (Supplementary Equation 22)
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where q denotes capped sector abatement in tons of CO2 equivalent. This yields a capped
sector total abatement cost (TACcapped) schedule
TACcapped(q) = 1.415× 10−8q2, (Supplementary Equation 23)
where total costs are denoted in dollars. We assume that capped sector required abatement,
denoted by q, is equal to 450, 1, 100 and 1, 760 so that the equilibrium offsets price under
the Minimize Supply of Non-Additional Offsets protocol equals p = 10, p = 25 and
p = 40, respectively. To solve for total compliance costs when offsets are not allowed,
we substitute the reduction target into (Supplementary Equation 23). To solve for capped
sector abatement, offset supply and costs when offsets are allowed, we allow the offsets price
(p) to be endogenously determined by the market-clearing condition that the sum of the
quantity of abatement by the capped sector and the supply of offsets equals the reduction
target:
A(p) + F (p) ≥ q, (Supplementary Equation 24)
A(p) and F (p) denote the quantity of abatement by the capped sector and offset supply by
uncapped units for an offsets price equal to p. As F (·) is a stochastic function, we take an
average of 2000 simulations to calibrate an expected supply of offsets schedule. We assume
that capped sector abatement is solved by setting the marginal abatement cost equal to the
offsets price (which, in equilibrium, will equal the allowance price):
A(p) = {A : MAC(A) = p} . (Supplementary Equation 25)
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Supplementary Table 1 | Parameter values.
Parameter description Parameter Value
Lower Bound of Marginal Costs of Mitigation c 0
Upper bound of Marginal Costs of Mitigation c 72
Lower Bound of BAU emissions u 0
Upper Bound of BAU emissions u 0.730
Lower Bound of Sequestration Potential s −2.054
Upper Bound of Sequestration Potential s 0
Standard Deviation of Emissions Shocks σ 0.353
Offsets Price p 25
Cost and price parameters are reported in (year 2000) dollars per ton of
CO2 equivalent. Emissions and sequestration parameters are reported
as million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
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Supplementary Table 2 | Ratio of super-additional reductions to non-additional
offsets: Varying the standard deviation of emissions shocks.
Baseline Relative to Observed BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Standard Deviation of
Emissions Shocks (σ)
0.5E[u] 138.24 20.56 4.40 0.96 0.27
0.75E[u] 58.14 8.95 2.03 0.59 0.24
E[u] 30.94 4.80 1.20 0.43 0.21
1.5E[u] 11.98 1.92 0.58 0.27 0.16
2E[u] 5.8 0.96 0.35 0.18 0.11
A ratio above 1 implies that the quantity of Super-Additional reductions exceeds the supply of
Non-Additional offsets. Our central setting assumes a standard deviation equal to the expected
value of BAU emissions (σ = E[u]).
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Supplementary Table 3 | Ratio of super-additional reductions to non-additional
offsets: Varying the price of offsets.
Baseline Relative to Observed BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Price of Offsets (p)
5 6.12 0.97 0.24 0.09 0.04
15 18.62 2.90 0.73 0.26 0.13
25 31.07 4.80 1.20 0.43 0.21
35 45.65 6.75 1.69 0.60 0.29
45 55.60 8.71 2.16 0.78 0.38
A ratio above 1 implies that the quantity of Super-Additional reductions exceeds the supply of
Non-Additional offsets. The price of offsets is denoted in (year 2000) dollars per ton of CO2
equivalent. Our central setting assumes a price of offsets equal to 25 dollars per ton.
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Supplementary Table 4 | Ratio of super-additional reductions to non-additional
offsets: Varying the marginal cost of mitigation.
Baseline Relative to Observed BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Marginal Cost
of Mitigation
5 124.98 19.01 4.69 1.68 0.83
15 51.60 8.05 1.99 0.72 0.35
25 31.07 4.80 1.20 0.43 0.21
35 22.05 3.45 0.81 0.33 0.15
45 17.24 2.69 0.67 0.24 0.12
A ratio above 1 implies that the quantity of Super-Additional reductions exceeds the supply
of Non-Additional offsets. The marginal cost of mitigation is denoted in (year 2000) dollars
per ton of CO2 equivalent. This value is used to calibrate the cost of mitigation curve.
Low values imply cheaper mitigation opportunities and a more compressed distribution of
marginal costs. Our central setting assumes a marginal cost of mitigation of 25 dollars per
ton.
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Supplementary Table 5 | Ratio of super-additional reductions to non-additional
offsets: Varying the correlation between marginal costs of mitigation and BAU
emissions.
Baseline Relative to Observed BAU emissions
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Correlation
Coefficient (ρu,c)
−0.8 42.52 6.33 1.44 0.46 0.22
−0.4 37.44 5.58 1.31 0.45 0.21
0 30.07 4.80 1.20 0.43 0.21
0.4 24.46 4.11 1.09 0.42 0.21
0.8 18.60 3.41 0.99 0.40 0.20
A ratio above 1 implies that the quantity of Super-Additional reductions exceeds the supply
of Non-Additional offsets. Our central setting assumes no correlation between marginal costs
of mitigation and BAU emissions.
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Supplementary Table 6 | The effect of neglecting super-additional reductions when selecting baselines: Varying the
standard deviation of emissions shocks.
Additional Offsets Total Offset Supply
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Standard
Deviation of
Emissions
Shocks (σ)
0.5E[u] 210 352 210 380
0.75E[u] 197 330 197 366
E[u] 186 309 186 353
1.5E[u] 170 275 170 318
2E[u] 159 246 159 285
Offset quantities are reported in MMTCO2e. Our central setting assumes a standard deviation equal to the expected value of BAU
emissions (σ = E[u]).
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Supplementary Table 7 | The effect of neglecting super-additional reductions when selecting baselines: Varying the
price of offsets.
Additional Offset Supply Total Offset Supply
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Price of Offsets (p)
5 37 54 37 65
15 116 179 116 205
25 186 309 186 353
35 261 445 261 497
45 335 580 335 641
Offset quantities are reported in MMTCO2e. Our central setting assumes a price of offsets equal to 25 dollars per ton of CO2
equivalent.
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Supplementary Table 8 | The effect of neglecting super-additional reductions when selecting baselines: Varying
the marginal cost of mitigation.
Additional Offset Supply Total Offset Supply
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Marginal Cost
of Mitigation
5 796 1, 230 796 1, 353
15 310 535 310 594
25 186 309 186 353
35 133 215 133 245
45 103 165 103 190
Offset quantities are reported in MMTCO2e. The marginal cost of mitigation is denoted in (year 2000) dollars per ton of CO2
equivalent. This value is used to calibrate the cost of mitigation curve. Low values imply cheaper mitigation opportunities and a
more compressed distribution of marginal costs. Our central setting assumes a marginal cost of mitigation of 25 dollars per ton
of CO2 equivalent.
S
-16
Supplementary Table 9 | The effect of neglecting super-additional reductions when selecting baselines: Varying
the correlation between marginal costs of mitigation and BAU emissions.
Additional Offset Supply Total Offset Supply
Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Correlation
Coefficient (ρu,c)
−0.8 171 311 171 357
−0.4 181 310 181 351
0 186 309 186 353
0.4 188 306 188 343
0.8 189 304 189 337
Offset quantities are reported in MMTCO2e. Our central setting assumes no correlation between marginal costs of mitigation and
BAU emissions.
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Supplementary Table 10 | The economic cost of neglecting super-additional
reductions.
(a) Offsets Price = 10 dollars per ton (q = 450 MMTCO2e)
No Offsets Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Abatement 450 361 311
Offset Supply 0 89 139
Capped Sector Abatement Costs 2,865 1,841 1,366
Offset Mitigation Costs 0 455 526
Total Compliance Costs 2,865 2,296 1,892
Cost Savings – 569 973
(b) Offsets Price = 25 dollars per ton (q = 1, 100 MMTCO2e)
No Offsets Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Abatement 1,100 881 752
Offset Supply 0 219 348
Capped Sector Abatement Costs 17,122 10,987 8,006
Offset Mitigation Costs 0 2,728 3,294
Total Compliance Costs 17,122 13,715 11,300
Cost Savings – 3,407 5,822
(c) Offsets Price = 40 dollars per ton (q = 1, 760 MMTCO2e)
No Offsets Minimize Supply of Maintain Environmental
Non-Additional Offsets Integrity
Capped Sector Abatement 1,760 1,410 1,189
Offset Supply 0 350 571
Capped Sector Abatement Costs 43,831 28,137 20,005
Offset Mitigation Costs 0 6,973 8,548
Total Compliance Costs 43,831 35,110 28,553
Cost Savings – 8,721 15,278
To accurately estimate the cost savings from offsets, we solve for an endogenous offsets price
for a given capped sector reduction target (q). The price scenarios represent the equilibrium
price under the Minimize Supply of Non-Additional Offsets protocol. To achieve higher (lower)
prices, we adjust the abatement requirement of the capped sector down (up). The offsets price
is slightly lower under the Maintain Environmental Integrity protocol because there is a larger
supply of offsets. Capped sector abatement and uncapped sector offsets are denoted in MMTCO2e.
Compliance costs are denoted in millions of (year 2000) dollars.
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